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I have long been puzzled by what philosophers have in mind when they talk about “basic desert,” 
“true moral responsibility,” or the “condemnatory force” of  moral criticism.   I have been 1
particularly puzzled by its presumed relation to some strong requirement of  freedom.  The 
presumption is that, if  we are not “free,” in some very strong sense, then we are not truly morally 
responsible and so do not deserve condemnation.   
I believe I have made some progress on this puzzlement, in an unexpected way.  Although it is 
often noted that the fairness of  a sanction requires an adequate opportunity to avoid it,  it is rarely 2
asked why—why does the fairness of  a sanction require an opportunity to avoid?  By pressing, hard, 
on this question, I believe I have come to better understand why someone might think that “freely” 
choosing to do wrong will, itself, have an extraordinarily strong and immediate effect on the way in 
which the interests of  the wrongdoer should matter to the rest of  us.  That is, I believe I have come 
to understand the relation between a strong form of  freedom and a status that might be called 
“condemnation” or a kind of  desert that might be called “basic.”  I here present what I take myself  
to have learned.  3
 Galen Strawson argues that “true moral responsibility” would require self-causation (Strawson 1994).  Derk Pereboom 1
has argued that “basic desert” requires the falsity of  determinism.  He says little about what “basic desert” is; if  I capture 
it here, then doing without it will require less revision than Pereboom imagines (Pereboom 2014).  Jay Wallace has 
criticized T. M. Scanlon’s conception of  blame as lacking in “opprobrium” (Wallace 2011).  Susan Wolf  often talks of  a 
special significance of  moral blame, and connects it to freedom (Wolf  1990).  They may have in mind what I here call 
“condemnation.”
 (Watson 1996)2
 Although every paper of  mine benefits tremendously from feedback, I have never had a paper so transformed as this 3
one.  It has been extremely gratifying.  I acknowledge many debts in the final footnote.  I here thank Stephen White, T. 
M. Scanlon, Dana Nelkin, and Manuel Vargas for helping me better locate my target and Sarah Stroud for asking me to 
simplify.
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Importantly, in presenting this understanding of  “condemnation” or of  “basic desert,” I am 
presenting an idea I do not endorse—in fact, one to which I am opposed.  I present it, hoping that, 
if  what I say accurately captures what people have in mind, it will also show how condemnation or 
desert, in this sense, can be left behind.   
SANCTIONS 
To begin, let us examine more carefully the idea of  sanction.   To sanction someone is to impose 4
something unpleasant or unwanted upon that person in response to his or her violation of  some 
some norm, demand, or expectation.  That is to say, sanctions are consequences that are created and 
attached to certain failures.  Parents sanction children for misbehaving; society penalizes its members 
for violating civil law; nations impose sanctions on other nations for pursuing weapons programs; 
teachers penalize students for turning in work late.   
In contrast, a hangover is not a sanction for drinking too much.  It is just a negative 
consequence.  Similarly, the big mess in your kitchen is a negative consequence of  last night’s dinner 
party.  The fact that you have to clean up that mess is not a sanction for having the party.  It is just 
your job, and no one else’s.   Sanctions are not simply negative consequences no one else is required 5
to bear for you.  They are negative consequences that have been created and attached, by some 
person or body, to certain violations or shortcomings.  As such, they raise concerns of  fairness.  
TWO QUESTIONS 
Now, two questions:  First, why do sanctions, so understood, raise concerns of  fairness?  Second, 
why should the fairness of  a sanction require an opportunity to avoid it? 
Some would answer both questions with a quick appeal to desert: Sanctions require opportunity 
to avoid because they are otherwise undeserved, and, if  undeserved, unfair. 
 “To sanction” can mean “to penalize” or “to endorse.”  Throughout, I mean “penalize.”  (I prefer “sanction,” for its 4
distance from “punishment.”)
 The mess is what Scanlon would call a “substantive responsibility”  (Scanlon 1998, chp 6).  I am, here, distinguishing 5
sanctions from other (mere) substantive responsibilities, in a way that, to my knowledge, Scanlon does not.  
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I find this appeal to desert unhelpful.  To see why, consider that it can be interpreted in two 
ways, which I will label deflationary and substantive.    
On the first, deflationary, reading, the question of  whether you “deserve” this or that reduces to, 
or is transparent to, the question of  whether giving it to you or imposing it upon you would be apt, 
justified, or fair.  Thus, saying that, without adequate opportunity to avoid, sanctions are undeserved 
is just a different way of  saying that, without such opportunity, they are inapt, unjustified, or unfair.  
Thus, the deflationary interpretation leaves our questions untouched.   
Even so, “undeserved” may be a useful label to introduce:  It may pick out the specific form of  
justification at work in cases of  penalties, prizes, punishments, and the like.  I have no objection to 
this.  However, we must bear in mind that, until we provide that underlying justification, our 
questions remain untouched—saying that fair sanctions require adequate opportunity to avoid 
because, without it, they are undeserved is like saying the sleeping pill works because of  its 
dormative virtue.   
Alternatively, one might think facts about desert can themselves provide independent reason to 
think sanctions are fair.  Call this an appeal to substantive desert.  On this view, we answer our original 
questions by appeal to desert, only immediately to face the further questions of  why undeserved 
sanctions are unfair and why, without adequate opportunity to avoid, sanctions are undeserved.  
These further questions are difficult to answer.   
One might take the difficulty of  answering these further questions as evidence that the claims 
are primitive, bedrock, or “basic.”  One might think that asking why undeserved sanctions are unfair 
or why deserved sanctions require opportunity to avoid is like asking why pain is bad: the claim is 
not empty (as on the deflationary reading), but it is not a question that needs an answer. 
I find the notion of  substantive desert opaque, and therefore I find the appeal to it as basic or 
bedrock unsatisfying.  It seems we can reasonably ask “Why does S deserve x on account of y?” or 
even, “What is it for S to deserve x on account of y?,” and that our answers (which cannot rely on 
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the idea of  substantive desert) should, themselves, show why giving x to S or imposing x upon S 
because of  y would be (pro tanto) fair.  (In contrast, answers to “Why is S in pain?” or “What is it for 
S to be in pain?” do not show why being in pain is bad.)  However, once we have an answer, we no 
longer need the notion of  substantive desert—we have returned to the deflationary interpretation.    6
Those who disagree might simply consider what follows as alternative answers given by 
someone who is not content to take desert as bedrock. 
Sanctions and Fairness 
Here, then, is an alternative answer to the question of  why sanctions raise concerns of  fairness:  
Unlike a hangover or the mess in your kitchen, sanctions are created, attached to certain failures, and 
imposed in given instances, by some person or body, through some voluntary action.  They are thus 
subject to the moral concerns raised by any voluntary action that impacts the interests of  others: any 
such voluntary action comes under the general ethical principle of  “do unto others as you would 
have them do unto you.”   (I take this to be about as bedrock a moral principle as you will find; I am 7
content to treat it as primitive.) 
Importantly, an appeal to “do unto others…” is not necessarily an appeal to fairness.  On its 
face, it is an appeal to empathy.  As noted by Kant, it can be used to ask for special treatment.  In his 
example, a convicted criminal appeals to it to ask for mercy—for special treatment—from the 
sentencing judge.   To understand “do unto others….” as counseling fairness, it must be understood 8
as generating principles that apply uniformly across the population.  So understood, it directs us to 
treat each person as best we can, consistent with treating others in the same way.  That is, asks us to 
adopt principles that treat the needs and interests of  each symmetrically while doing adequately well 
 One might yet disagree, thinking that desert is something like a “thick” ethical concept, something like courage or 6
kindness (Williams 1985).
 Or, at least, “Do not do to others what you would not have done to you.”  In contrast, non-voluntary attitudes, such as 7
distrust, can burden others without raising the same concerns of  fairness.  See (Hieronymi 2004, in progress).
 (Kant 1997). ADD academy numbers8
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by all.  I am, again, content to treat as bedrock the idea that we ought, in our voluntary actions, to 
comply with principles that treat each symmetrically while doing adequately well by all.  I will refer to 
these as principles of  fairness.  9
In coming to conclusions about fairness, what counts as “symmetric” or as “adequate” will, of  
course, be hotly contested—but, if  we are contesting fairness, then, I suggest, we are contesting 
whether a given policy or principle treats the interests of  each symmetrically and adequately well.   
An important caveat: what if  some people have a special interest in—take a special delight in or 
psychologically benefit from—belittling others?  Or what if  some people have a special interest in, 
or take special delight in, being given special treatment or enjoying special status—being treated 
asymmetrically well, relative to others?  Must these interests be treated symmetrically with other 
interests, in determining principles of  fairness?  Plausibly, no.  To propose that such interests be 
accommodated is to propose treating some asymmetrically poorly.  Such a proposal is incompatible 
with treating others symmetrically and adequately well.  And, therefore, these interests need not—in 
fact, cannot—be counted among those that must be symmetrically balanced and adequately served, in 
a determination of  fairness.  Such interests are, we might say, silenced.   This idea of  silencing will be 10
important later. 
In answer, then, to the first question: the institution or imposition of  a sanction raises concerns 
of  fairness because it is a voluntary action that burdens others.  A sanction, or a system of  sanctions, 
will be fair if  but only if  it treats the interests of  each symmetrically while doing adequately well by 
all.  I will take this much as read and turn to the second question.  
  This is a broadly contractualist interpretation of  the everyday notion of  fairness.  I believe such an interpretation is 9
natural—the success of  my diagnosis depends on it being so. 
 These interests  are “unreasonable” in Scanlon’s terminology: incompatible with a commitment to finding reasonable 10
principles.  I draw the term “silenced” from (McDowell 1979). 
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Fairness and Opportunity 
Our second question is, why would fairness require that sanctions be imposed only if  there was 
adequate opportunity to avoid them?  What is the connection between treating each symmetrically and 
adequately well and ensuring adequate opportunity to avoid sanction?   11
To start, we can note a general presumption against imposing burdens on others.  That 
presumption must be overcome if  a sanction is to be justified.  It is typically overcome by some 
important purpose served by the sanction: typically, a sanction provides an incentive or deterrent—
that is, it influences peoples’ choices—in order to achieve certain goals or to protect certain 
interests.   For example, instructors institute late penalties to provide students an incentive to 12
submit their work by the deadline, thus ensuring both that students have roughly the same amount 
of  time to complete the assignment and that the instructor has adequate time to mark and return it, 
enabling learning during the term.  (Importantly, the fact that a system of  sanction serves a purpose 
does not the justification of  sanctioning, in a particular case, “forward looking” or 
“consequentialist.”  Once instituted, a system of  sanctions is fair only if  it is uniformly enforced.  
Enforcement is always “backwards looking.”) 
Because a system of  sanctions is fair only if  it treats each person’s interests symmetrically and 
adequately well, the importance of  serving the purposes of  the sanction (providing an incentive, 
getting papers turned in) must be sufficient to overcome the risk of  incurring the burden that is 
faced by each individual.  It would be unfair, e.g., to completely impoverish those who turn in work 
late, even if  that sanction were symmetrically enforced, because the risk, to each, of  incurring such a 
sanction (though, say, bad luck or false accusation) far outweighs its benefits.  It would treat each 
symmetrically, but not adequately well.   
 Scanlon explores the broader question of  why we have for wanting what happens to depend on our choices in (1998, 11
chp 6).  I here focus, narrowly, on sanction.
 In other case, it serves to manage risk—these cases of  “strict liability” are insensitive to opportunities to avoid.12
6
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Notice—it will be important later—that the disproportionately severe sanction is ruled out, not 
simply because it is, in some simply brute or intuitive way, “disproportionate,” but specifically 
because, given the severity of  the sanction, the risk of  incurring it outweighs its benefit, and 
therefore it fails to treat each adequately well.  
Of  course, in the absence of  any opportunity to avoid a sanction, imposing it could not provide 
the intended incentive or deterrent—without an opportunity to avoid it, there is nothing for the 
sanction to influence.  Thus, if  we were to institute a system of  sanctions that remains insensitive to 
one’s opportunity to avoid it, we would put people at risk of  incurring pointless harm.  It would be 
better if  our system made exceptions for cases in which there was no opportunity to avoid.  In fact, 
such exceptions seem required by fairness. 
Here, then, is a suggested answer to the second question: Fair sanctions require adequate 
opportunity to avoid, because, without such opportunity, imposing the sanction will burden interests 
for no purpose.  Doing so fails to treat the interests of  each symmetrically and adequately well. 
A THIRD QUESTION: THE ADEQUACY OF OPPORTUNITY 
We now face a third question, one that will ultimately bring us to the issue of  freedom.  It is this: 
What makes a person’s opportunity to avoid sanction adequate for fairness?   
Here is an initial, natural hypothesis:  A student has adequate opportunity to avoid the late 
penalty just in case the student faces a choice (or, series of  choices) by which they could successfully 
avoid the penalty.  
This natural hypothesis can be supported in two very different ways.  The first repeats the above: 
if  the student did not faces choices by which they could avoid the penalty, there was nothing for the 
penalty to incentivize.  Supported in this way, choice is necessary for fairness.  The alternative appeals 
to control and to something like desert, reasoning that, if  the student faced a choice, it was up to the 
student whether they incurred the penalty or not.   Because the penalty was, in this way, in the 13
 Thanks to Michael McKenna for highlighting the connection between desert and control.13
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student’s control, they they cannot complain the burden is unfair.  They made their bed, so they can 
lie in it.  On this way of  thinking, choice is sufficient for fair penalty.   
The natural hypothesis is incorrect:  The fact that someone faces a choice by which they would 
avoid the sanction is neither necessary nor sufficient to ensure that they had adequate opportunity to 
avoid it.   
First, choice is not sufficient.  Suppose that the assignment was given on short notice during a 
period in which the student faced a series of  time-consuming events of  familial, religious, or cultural 
importance.  It is plausible that, even though the student may knowingly choose to incur the penalty, 
and could have chosen, instead, to complete the assignment and avoid the penalty (in however 
strong a sense of  “could have” one likes), the penalty may nonetheless be unfair—and, unfair 
because the student did not have adequate opportunity to avoid it.  Whether the student had adequate 
opportunity to avoid turns, in part, on the quality of  the opportunity, so to speak—i.e., on the other 
burdens that one incurs in order to avoid it.  Those other burdens may be unfair.  If  so, the fact that 
you choose which burden you incur does not render the sanction fair.  Choice is not sufficient. 
More surprisingly, choice is also not necessary for adequate opportunity to avoid.  Consider a 
student who simply forgot about the assignment or who overslept and missed the deadline.  There 
was no choice the student faced by which they would avoid the sanction.  Yet, depending on the 
circumstances, the student may have had adequate opportunity to avoid it.  
This surprising conclusion requires investigation.  Let us focus on the student who overslept.  
They may try to advance the above argument: Enforcing the late penalty on oversleepers does not 
provide an effective incentive—those who oversleep cannot turn back time to correct their error.  
Thus, the sanction burdens them for no purpose; it is therefore unfair.  
8
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This line of  reasoning can be challenged in two ways.   First, one might argue that, though no 14
one can turn back time, enforcing the late penalty on the oversleeper nonetheless provides an 
incentive: it creates an incentive for students to take steps to ensure they do not oversleep or to turn 
their work in a bit in advance, to guard against unforeseen difficulties.   
In effect, this first challenge simply insists that the oversleeping student did face some choice by 
which they would have avoided the penalty: perhaps a choice about whether to stay up very late, or 
whether to put off  the work until the final hours.   
One might object: although oversleeping can sometimes be avoided through better planning, 
sometimes it cannot.  Even the most conscientious of  students, with excellent time-management 
habits, a reliable alarm clock, and a plan to submit work in advance, can find everything goes wrong 
and, really, there was nothing they could have done to avoid missing the deadline.  Even the most 
conscientious sometimes fail, through sheer bad luck.  Enforcing the penalty in such cases, one 
might object, is unfair.      
In reply, notice, first, that when we say that, really, there was nothing the fully conscientious 
student could have done, in contrast to student who could have better managed their time, we are 
not marking a difference in the metaphysical freedom of  these two students.  When we say the fully 
conscientious student “could not have avoided” the penalty, we are not ruling out all counter-factual 
possibility of  avoiding it.  Strictly speaking, there were things the fully conscientious student might 
have done: they might have set a second or third alarm clock, for example.  In fact, we could 
stipulate that determinism is false, that the student enjoys libertarian freedom, and that the student 
owns three working alarm clocks—even so, the fully conscientious oversleeper could still complain 
that there was nothing they could have done to avoid the penalty.  In saying so, they are saying they 
did everything that could reasonably be expected of  them and yet failed through bad luck.  To say they failed 
 A third doubt is this: One might think late penalties function, not only as incentives, but also to level the playing field.  14
Students who submit work late likely benefit from the extra time, and so their grade should be handicapped, so to speak.  
I set this aside and focus only on the late penalty as an incentive. 
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through “sheer bad luck” is to say they did everything that could be reasonably expected of  them 
and yet, surprisingly, they did not thereby avoid the failure.    15
In such a case, one might think, the late penalty serves no purpose and is, therefore, unfair.  We 
should carve out an exception for the conscientious oversleeper—though perhaps not for the typical 
oversleeper. 
We now encounter the second challenge:  Sometimes making exceptions will generate costs 
greater than the cost of  the sanction.  If  so, then choosing instead to enforce the sanction may yet 
treat each symmetrically and adequately well—it may be fair—even though the one on whom it is 
enforced did all that could reasonably be expected and failed through sheer bad luck.  We might say 
that enforcing, in such cases, serves the secondary purpose of  avoiding the costs of  the exception.  
To explain:  The institution and administration of  a sanction, in practice, will implicate interests 
beyond those most directly served by it.  These will be highly context-dependent.  For example, 
interests of  both the instructor and students require that enforcing the sanction not involve a 
significant expenditure of  the instructor’s time nor a significant invasion of  student privacy.  The 
interests of  students require that the policy cannot be too easily “gamed.”  These further interests 
will have different implications in a very large class than in a very small one.  They may also have 
different implications in an extremely competitive environment, in which gaming the system will be 
more tempting or more prevalent, than in a more cooperative culture, in which there is more trust.     
Notice, next, that the task of  discriminating between the fully conscientious and the less-than-
fully-conscientious student is neither easy nor costless.  Unless the instructor both is and is known 
to be, not only familiar with, but also a judicious and objective judge of, the character of  all the 
students, the instructor will not be able to decide either whether a student is fully conscientious, or 
honest, by appeal to their “sense” of  the students, without risking serious unfairness.  There is, on 
 Thanks to Julie Tannenbaum for pointing out the possibility of  a third alarm clock.   For related discussion see 15
(Hieronymi 2007).
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the one hand, the worry that the instructor will show favoritism to those with whom they feel some 
affinity, and, on the other hand, the worry that students will be able to deceive the otherwise the 
judicious instructor.  One might guard against these risks by requiring some sort of  investigation 
into either the general habits or the fateful morning of  the oversleeping student—but that will likely 
require an unacceptable invasion of  the student’s privacy.  One might try to allow oversleeping, 
generally, to be a reason for exemption—but then one might need to grant a lot of  exemptions, 
allowing for other kinds of  bad luck, in the interests of  fairness.  One might try to accommodate the 
bad luck by allowing, for everyone, a “one time” exception to the late policy.  But this is an imperfect 
solution: it will reduce the effectiveness of  the late policy, generally, and it does not address the fact 
that someone could encounter genuine bad luck twice in the term.   
Taking into account all these difficulties, we might conclude that making an exception for the 
fully conscientious will create costs that are higher than the costs of  late penalty.  We might then 
conclude that the system that serves each students’ interests most fully and fairly will enforce the late 
penalty even in certain cases in which, it is admitted, the student made no poor choices and simply 
suffers from bad luck.  The bad luck, we might think, will be acceptably distributed, and the costs of  
rooting it out of  the system high, and so, we might think, it is consistent with fairness to let the bad 
luck fall where it does.  We might view the risk of  incurring the late penalty through bad luck as a 
risk we can each accept, a cost worth incurring, given the gains to be had by implementing the late 
penalty.  Enforcing the penalty is fair, because it treats each symmetrically and adequately well.    16
Summarizing the case of  the conscientious oversleeper:  The sanction is triggered by failing to 
meet the deadline, but it is possible to trigger the sanction even though one made the choices the 
sanction was designed to incentivize.   The trigger is not the failed choices, but rather a typical 17
consequence of  them.  In some of  the cases in which the trigger was tripped through bad luck, an 
 Cf. Scanlon’s reasoning in (1998, chp 6) about the toxic waste project.16
 Thanks to John F. Horty for this helpful way of  summarizing the position.17
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exception can be fairly made (as, for example, when someone is hospitalized and therefore fails to 
turn in their paper).  Fairness then requires it.  But sometimes making an exception introduces too 
many other costs, as with oversleeping.  In such cases, the sanction may be fairly enforced even 
though no poor choices were made.  Surprisingly, choice is not necessary for fairness.   
This conclusion is controversial.  Before considering the controversy, let us return to our third 
question: What makes a person’s opportunity to avoid sanction adequate for fairness?  We face a 
notational choice between two options.  First, we might say that an adequate opportunity would 
ensure that the penalty depends on your choices: so long as you avoid poor choices, you avoid the 
penalty.  That is, we might say that bad luck renders opportunity inadequate.  Thus, if  you had an 
adequate opportunity and you are nonetheless sanctioned, you have your own choices to blame, so 
to speak. 
This first option fits nicely with intuitions about desert, but it carries two high costs.  First, in a 
wide range of  cases it will be extremely difficult (perhaps impossible) to determine, with any 
precision, when someone had adequate opportunity.  To determine whether they had adequate 
opportunity, we will have to determine whether the failure was due to poor choices.  That will 
require specifying what could be reasonably expected at each decision-point leading to the failure.  
While certain things will be clear enough (do not stay up late without setting an alarm), there will be 
significant, yet reasonable, disagreement about many details (should you set a second alarm the night 
before every important deadline? how important?)—we may reasonably disagree about these details 
even while agreeing the deadline is reasonable.   
In addition, you might fail in the details (fail to set your second alarm, e.g.) due to bad luck.  And 
so, to determine whether you had an adequate opportunity to turn in the paper, we will need to 
determine whether you had an adequate opportunity to set the second alarm.  The problem will 
repeat, at that point.  Thus, even if  we agreed on the details, the task is unworkably large.  
12
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A second cost might offset the first: though it may be nearly impossible to determine whether 
someone had adequate opportunity, we need not do so—because, if  we insist that bad luck renders 
opportunity inadequate, then adequate opportunity is not required for fairness—as shown by the 
case of  the conscientious oversleeper.  
The case of  the conscientious oversleeper poses a dilemma:  If  adequate opportunity to avoid 
sanction ensures that the fully conscientious avoid sanction, then adequate opportunity is not 
required for fairness.  Or, if  fairness requires adequate opportunity, adequate opportunity cannot 
rule out bad luck. 
I prefer the second horn of  this dilemma:  Fairness requires an adequate opportunity, but 
adequate opportunity is no guarantee against bad luck.  Taking this horn, we can determine whether 
an opportunity was adequate in the process of  determining whether enforcing the sanction would 
be unfair.  If  enforcing the sanction would be unfair because of  bad luck (as when hospitalized or in 
a car accident), then the opportunity was inadequate.   However, if  bad luck does not undermine 18
the fairness of  the penalty, it also does not undermine the adequacy of  the opportunity (as in the 
case of  the conscientious oversleeper). 
A benefit of  the second horn: we can simply grant, without arguing the details, that the 
conscientious oversleeper did everything we could reasonably expect, but add short of  meeting the 
deadline.   That is, we can maintain the deadline is reasonable even while granting that it is 19
 Note that adequate opportunity can includes what I earlier called the “quality” of  your opportunity.  Further, the quality 18
of  your opportunity may be extremely poor, though bad luck, and yet it may still be fair to enforce the penalty, because 
making an exception would be more costly.  Thanks to Angela M. Smith for asking about such cases.
 Thanks to Randolph Clarke for pressing on this point.19
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sometimes possible to miss it due despite making all the right choices.   The deadline remains 20
reasonable for the same complex of  reasons that show the penalty remains fair.   21
This use of  “adequate” will be controversial, but it makes only a notational difference to the 
argument below.  The real source of  controversy is the claim that a sanction may be fairly enforced 
when the trigger was tripped due to bad luck.  We consider objections in the next sections. 
Two final observations.  First, in order for the system of  sanctions to treat each, including those 
who may incur it through bad luck, symmetrically and adequately well, the possibility of  incurring it 
through bad luck must be minimized.  The risk of  incurring the sanction through bad luck must be 
weighed against the interests served by it, resulting in (what we might call) the minimally effective 
sanction.   Therefore, the interests of  the unlucky are not silenced, in the determination of  the 22
penalty, in the way that an interest in belittling others or an interest in special treatment are silenced.  
To the contrary, their interests count just as much as anyone’s, in constraining the sanction.  
Second, notice that these same conclusions about fairness might be reached when the inability to 
avoid the sanction is due to constitutional weakness in the individual.  Consider, for example, 
Professor Procrastinate.  Like most professors, Procrastinate regularly takes books from the library.  
But, due to his inveterate procrastination, Procrastinate is sure to miss the deadline for returning 
them.  Let us stipulate that Procrastinate lacks the ability to avoid the late fine.  Is enforcing the late 
fine therefore unfair?  Plausibly, no.  Plausibly (detail must be filled in ), Procrastinate would 23
 We can be confident that such cases will be rare: if  bad luck were common, the risk of  incurring sanction will 20
outweigh the benefit, and the sanction will be unfair. See footnote XX.
 The ethics drives the metaphysics: whether there was an adequate opportunity (whether you “could have” in the 21
relevant sense) is determined by whether the penalty would be fair.  (Note the similarity to Strawson’s optimist: we are 
defining something that sounds like freedom by appeal to something more pragmatic.   The optimist appeals to efficacy.  
I have, instead, appealed to fairness.)
 The possibility of  false accusation likewise requires the minimally effective sanction.  In some cases, the risks of  bad 22
luck or false accusation may result in abandoning the sanction altogether.
 Including: the importance and relative abundance of  the good (books) being shared; the cost of  providing that good, 23
free and clear, to anyone who needs it; the prevalence of  Procrastinate’s condition; social stigma or disadvantage 
associated with that condition, etc.   
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instead, due to his constitutional weakness, fairly loose his lending privileges.  (He may need to work 
in the library.)  
We have now answered three questions:  Sanctions trigger concerns of  fairness because they are 
created and imposed through voluntary actions that burden the interests of  others.  They require 
adequate opportunity to avoid because, without such opportunity, they burden interests for no 
purpose and thereby fail to treat each symmetrically and adequately well.  However, in some cases in 
which a person trips the trigger of  a sanction despite doing all that could be reasonably expected to 
avoid it, enforcing the sanction may still be fair—it may still treat each symmetrically and adequately 
well (because it serves some secondary purpose).  Thus, if  adequate opportunity to avoid sanction is 
required for fairness, it is possible to have had adequate opportunity to avoid it even if  you did all 
that could reasonably be expected to avoid it, as with the oversleeping student, and, it seems, even if  
you suffer from some constitutional weakness that prevents you from avoiding it, as with 
Procrastinate.  Adequate opportunity does not rule out bad luck.  (Or, if  it does, it is not required 
for fairness.) 
This final, surprising conclusion transgresses ordinary intuitions about the fairness of  sanctions
—intuitions that one might express using “desert.”  One might, reluctantly, grant that a late penalty 
could be fairly enforced on the unlucky, for the reasons given above.  But, one might feel that the 
unlucky do not really deserve the penalty—precisely because they did all that could be reasonably 
expected.  We now turn to this objection.  
OBJECTION: TRULY FAIR VS. FAIR IN PRACTICE 
The objector grants that there is some sense in which a late penalty might be fairly enforced on the 
unlucky, but hopes to mark a distinction between what we might call the “truly fair” and the merely 
“fair in practice.”  A late penalty is truly fair, the objector might say, only if  the person has not done 
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all that could be reasonably expected, short of  tripping the trigger.  If, instead, the person trips the 
trigger through bad luck, the penalty is only “fair in practice.” 
I have no objection to marking the difference between those cases in which a person did or did 
not do all that could be reasonably expected—cases in which the sanction is or is not serving its 
original, rather than secondary, purpose.  But I doubt this difference is well labeled as a difference 
between the “truly fair” and something else.  If  fairness is a matter of  treating each person’s 
interests symmetrically and adequately well, then the penalty is fair, full stop, in both cases.  The fact 
that, in certain cases, the sanction does not serve the original purpose of  providing an incentive does 
not seem to bear on its fairness, so understood. 
One might suggest that the unlucky cases arise only because of  unfortunate practical limitations
—because we cannot perfectly align the trigger with poor choice.  In a perfect world, the trigger 
would be failure-due-to-poor-choice.  Then, without a poor choice, the sanction would be unfair 
because, so to speak, inaccurate: the trigger was never tripped. 
I doubt that, even in the ideal world, we would want to identify the trigger with poor choice, 
because I doubt that even the ideal world would include as much agreement about the details of  
planning and as much transparency of  our thought and behavior to one another (or to ourselves) as 
that would require.  There are good reasons to let the trigger be an outcome, simply. 
However, one might idealize, not by imagining agreement or transparency amongst ourselves, 
but rather by imagining the sanction is somehow magically—or, perhaps better, divinely and 
omnisciently—enforced only when the person did not do all that could reasonably be expected.   24
Then the trigger would be failure-due-to-poor-choice, and in unlucky cases the sanction would be 
unfair because inaccurate.  Thus, in this magically or divinely ordered world, one could always avoid 
fair sanction by making good choices.  
 Thanks to Angela M. Smith for pressing this possibility.24
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This is, indeed, the ordinary intuition about desert—that truly deserved sanctions require poor 
choices.  But we should again wonder: why should “true” fairness require omniscience or magic?  
That is, why should be a matter of  fairness that the trigger for a sanction should be a poor choice, 
rather than some outcome, given that, short of  agreement, transparency, omniscience, or magic, we 
are able to treat each one symmetrically and adequately well? 
One might answer:  Because we ought, as a matter of  fairness, to be able to control whether bad 
things happen to us by making good choices.   
This is a powerful intuition.  I am very sorry to say, it seems, to me, a fantasy.  It is an 
understandable fantasy, with strong roots in childhood, and a noble one.  But a fantasy nonetheless.  
Life is not, in this way, fair.  Nor could we, in our interactions or social institutions, make it so—for 
the reasons given above (about agreement and transparency).  That you could not have avoided a 
burden by choosing well does not entail that the burden is unfair—though, if  the burden is a 
sanction, it makes it likely to be unfair; for the reasons above, sanctions should typically be 
avoidable.  
Still, the intuition that an unlucky sanction is always undeserved and/or unfair remains strong.  It 
needs further accounting. 
OBJECTION: NOT A MORAL SANCTION 
Someone might, at this point, raise the objection in a new guise:  We have been misled by 
considering the wrong cases.  Late penalties and library fines, understood as I have suggested, are 
not moral sanctions—as clearly shown by the two facts I highlighted: that the choices and the 
sanction can part company, as in the case of  the oversleeper, and that one can incur the penalty due 
to constitutional weaknesses, as in the case of  Procrastinate.  Given these facts, no one would think 
incurring the penalty, per se, is a reason for guilt, condemnation, opprobrium, or moral judgment.  It 
has been stripped of  any distinctively moral force or significance.  That distinctive moral significance 
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is what raises special concerns about fairness and luck—it is what requires, for fairness, choice and 
opportunity. 
To make the objection more stark, we can introduce a distinction between a price and a moral 
sanction.  The objector might claim that systems of  sanctions, as I describe them, are simply pricing 
systems, designed to achieve certain goals or solve certain problems.  For the partying student, the 
late penalty is the price of  partying.  For the conscientious oversleeper, the penalty is bad luck—a 
kind of  bad luck we created when we created the pricing system.  The risk of  bad luck, of  this sort, 
it is price of  the pricing system, so to speak.  But moral sanctions are a different beast.  Their 
distinctive significance raises special requirements of  fairness; their justification is not sensitive to 
secondary purposes in the pragmatic way outlined above.   25
What then, is a moral sanction?  One might reply, flat-flootedly but accurately enough, it is a 
sanction for a moral failing.  Further, moral sanctions differ from others only in their special 
significance.  Thus, ordinary sanctions, such as monetary penalties, grade deductions, or restrictions 
of  movement, can become moral sanctions, if  incurred for a moral failing.  They then somehow take 
on a distinctive significance.  Likewise, certain forms of  treatment (avoiding someone; explaining, in 
some detail, how they failed) might become moral sanction (condemnation, reproach, etc.) when 
incurred for moral failing.  Moral sanctions do not differ from others “materially,” so to speak, but 
only in their special, moral significance. 
Why, then, does this moral significance require a poor choice?  As an initial answer, we can note 
that many simply identify moral failings with immoral choices.   It then follows that moral sanctions 26
are unfair without immoral choice, because inaccurate: one did not trip the trigger. 
 CITE Feinberg, thank Scanlon.25
 Or, with actions-due-to-immoral-choices.  This is a controversial assumption.  Some think failures of  character are 26
moral failures, others think failures in action can be moral failures.  See (Tannenbaum 2015).  For present purposes, it is 
enough if  the objector agrees that sanctionable moral failings are immoral choices.  Thanks to Angela M. Smith.
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By putting these thoughts together, we can account for the difference between “truly fair” 
sanctions and those that are only fair “in practice:”  Without an immoral choice, the distinctive 
significance a moral sanction is unfair, because inaccurate.  This may be so, even if  the ordinary 
sanction (the fine or grade deduction) could still be fairly imposed, once stripped of  the moral 
significance.  Thus, sanctions carrying moral significance must be “truly fair”—incurred for immoral 
choices—while sanctions stripped of  that significance may nonetheless be “fair in practice.” 
This much seems both plausible and opaque.   
Accepting it for the moment, we can ask two questions: First, what is this special moral significance?  
Second, why should it, whatever it is, be reserved for, or “deserved” only by, immoral choices?  Call 
these “the remaining questions.” 
I believe I have stumbled across an answer to the remaining questions, one that might make 
some sense of  what people have in mind by “basic desert,” “condemnation,” or “true moral 
responsibility” and might connect those to an especially strong form of  freedom.  In what follows I 
present my answer by engaging in an admittedly odd exercise. 
ANSWERING THE REMAINING QUESTIONS:  
SANCTIONS UNDER THE PRESUMPTION OF MORAL FREEDOM 
The odd exercise requires us to assume what many ethicists, both incompatibilists and neo-Kantian 
compatibilists, have assumed: insofar as we are subject to moral requirements, we are thereby also, at 
each point, able to avoid violating those requirements, no matter our contingent psychology, history, 
or environment.  As it is sometimes put, ought implies can.  We have this degree of  freedom: our 
history and environment will not prevent us from doing what is morally required.  Call this moral 
freedom (short for “freedom to do what is morally required”).  (Asserting moral freedom is similar to, 
but not the same as, denying determinism. )   27
 Those who advocate libertarian freedom may think it ensures moral freedom; the reverse is not true.27
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Kant advocates moral freedom in the Critique of  Practical Reason.  He there asks his reader to 
imagine a man asked by his prince to give false testimony against an innocent person.  A gallows is 
placed before the man, on which he will be hanged, should he refuse.  Kant says of  the man, “He 
would perhaps not venture to assert whether he would [tell the truth] or not, but he must admit 
without hesitation that it would be possible for him.” (5:30)  Kant concludes that awareness of  our 
obligation reveals our noumenal freedom (employing the rule that ought implies can). 
Kant’s use of  the example is less an argument than a somewhat high-handed appeal for 
agreement—almost a dare.  One can imagine a sincere, unselfconscious, but hard-bitten person 
refusing to admit that it would be possible for them to refuse the prince at the cost of  their own life.  
Such a person might admit there is, indeed, a question that they are facing—whether to give false 
testimony—and therefore, in that sense, two possible answers in front of  them.  But they might 
insist it would be simply foolish to refuse to give the false testimony—as foolish as giving away all 
your money to the poor, or, for that matter, as foolish as concluding that the sum of  two and three 
is one.  As surely as arriving at either of  the latter two answers is not, for them, a genuine possibility, 
so, too, they might claim, refusing the prince is not a genuine possibility.   In fact, even a reasonably 28
sensitive person might conclude that, faced with the gallows, they will be in the unhappy position of  
Procrastinate: unable to do what they also believe they ought to do.   They need not be evading 29
responsibility, in saying so.   
 The Kantian will say that arriving at a mathematical error is not a genuine possibility for a rational creature, because it 28
is against reason.  (Of  course, it is possible to make mathematical errors, though not, one might want to say, to do so 
knowingly.)  The Kantian claims that acting contrary to duty is likewise against reason (though it seems possible to do so 
knowingly).  The claim presently at issue is whether acting as (you know) duty requires is always possible, for those 
endowed with reason.  This seems to me either a stipulation of  what is meant by “endowed with reason” or else false.  
If  the former, then it seems implausible to claim that only those “endowed with reason” are subject to moral 
requirements.
 The example is complicated by the fact that one could wonder whether giving false testimony to avoid certain death is 29
in fact wrong.  One might think the falsely accused is not wronged by a false accusation given in self-defense (so to 
speak).  In fairness to Kant, alter the example until you feel truthful testimony is required but extremely costly.
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Kant’s picture of  human freedom rules out both characters as either insincere or self-deceived, 
in some sort of  bad faith.  On his picture, when Reason becomes practical, it obeys its own law, 
unconstrained by empirical facts.  Thus, anyone who is subject to the moral law can also satisfy it—
so that, as St. Paul says, man is without excuse. 
The assumption of  moral freedom is extremely strong.  If  moral requirements require not only 
to making the right choices, but also bringing about certain outcomes, then we could not enjoy moral 
freedom.  The world is often, obviously, uncooperative.   Thus, to make moral freedom plausible, 30
we need to shrink our duties, so to speak: when things go wrong despite our best intentions, we have 
done no moral wrong.   Moral failing is only a failing of  willing.   Let this be so, for the purposes 31 32
of  our diagnosis.  
Even this restriction may not be enough.  Humans are born unable to satisfy ordinary adult 
obligations, and moral development is messy and uncertain.  Some seem to reach adulthood without 
the ability to make good choices—they are too insensitive, petty, frail of  ego, etc.  In the face of  
these apparent counter-examples, the advocate of  moral freedom might shrink moral duties further:  
Those unfortunate souls who lack the ability to satisfy moral demands are, for that reason, not 
subject to them.  Thus, some people are not actually failing, morally, when they seem to be—though 
it will be difficult to tell who, when.  Let this be so, for the purposes of  the diagnosis.  
Opposite the presumption of  moral freedom stands what we might call (sloppily) the 
presumption of  original sin: the claim that we are unable to do what we are nonetheless morally 
required to do.  At its strongest, the presumption of  original sin claims that we are never able to avoid 
 A fact explored by the literature on “moral luck.”30
 “Things going wrong” includes innocent mistakes.31
 See, again, (Tannenbaum 2015).32
21
—draft—
wrong choices—that our choices, or motives, are always corrupt.   A weaker version claims that, 33
though we are sometimes able to choose well, at other times we can find ourselves unable to choose as 
morality requires.  It denies Kant at the gallows.   Even the weaker (and I think very plausible) 
version of  original sin is ruled out by moral freedom.     
With the presumption of  moral freedom in place, let us begin our odd exercise:  Let us, as before, 
consider the fairness of  sanctions (of  any sort: emotional, monetary, corporeal), still understood as 
incentives, but now as incentives to make morally required choices.   Let us, further, stipulate that 34
the trigger for the sanction is the immoral choice—so the sanction will be unfair, because inaccurate, 
without an immoral choice.  Now: given moral freedom, under what conditions would a sanction for 
an immoral choice be fair—i.e., treat the interests of  each symmetrically and adequately well? 
Notice, first, that, by stipulating that the choice is immoral, we have eliminated the concern about 
what we earlier called the quality of  opportunity to avoid the sanction.  Unlike the student who was 
given an assignment on short notice during a time of  significant cultural or religious commitments, 
the quality of  an opportunity to avoid wrongdoing is always adequate.  To say that the choice is wrong 
is to say that costs of  avoiding the choice—the burdens a potential wrongdoer will bear, to avoid 
wrongdoing—do not justify making it.     35
Notice, next, that by stipulating both that the trigger for the sanction is the choice itself  and that 
everyone has the ability to make that choice regardless of  their contingent history or circumstances, 
we have also eliminated the possibility of  incurring the sanction even though you have done all that 
 I am appropriating “original sin.”  Properly, it is the Christian doctrine according to which each person, from birth, 33
carries the original sin of  Adam and Eve and is therefore unable to achieve righteousness on their own.  The doctrine of  
“total depravity” would be a better choice for this strongest claim, that our motives are always corrupt.  
 This is odd for many reasons.  One: if  moral choice requires pure motives, it cannot be incentivized.34
 As required by moral freedom, I am presuming that in cases of  “moral dilemmas,” either one horn is (tragic but) 35
morally required or either horn is (tragic but) morally permissible (and, perhaps, leaving “moral remainders”). 
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could be reasonably expected—we have eliminated bad luck.  By stipulation, all that was expected 
was a choice, and, given moral freedom, that could be reasonably expected.   
Unfortunately, we have not eliminated the possibility of  false accusation.   Therefore we must 36
continue to institute only the minimally effective sanction.  Again, this requirement might appear 
under the label “proportionality:” the severity of  the sanction must not exceed the importance of  
providing the incentive, lest it put the innocent at risk of  needless harm. 
So far so good.  Now let us consider an even narrower, odder question.  Suppose we could, 
somehow (with omniscience?) eliminate the possibility of  false accusation.  Given moral freedom, 
under what conditions would sanctions treat a correctly accused wrongdoer fairly?  Or, to put the 
question differently, in establishing principles that govern a system of  sanctions that treats each 
symmetrically and adequately well, how would we take into account the interests of  those who (in 
fact) make immoral choices?  
It seems to me the answer must be, we will not.  Or, better, under the presumption of  moral 
freedom, when considering the fairness of  a sanction for an immoral choice, we cannot take into 
account the interests of  one who makes an immoral choice.  This is because, in presuming moral 
freedom, we have guaranteed that avoiding the burdens imposed by such a sanction is something 
any potential wrongdoer both could do (because of  moral freedom) and should do (because doing 
otherwise is wrong), themselves, by choosing well.  Thus, once we eliminate the possibility of  false 
accusation, there is no risk of  incurring the sanction without choosing wrongly—something that, 
under the presumption of  moral freedom, everyone can always avoid.  Thus, to seek to protect the 
interests that would be burdened by a sanction against choosing wrongly is, under the presumption 
of  moral freedom, tantamount to seeking to protect an interest in choosing to do wrong—seeking to 
maintain the possibility of  doing wrong without harming those interests (too much).  But, an 
 In fact, we may have made false accusation more likely by shrinking moral requirements in the face of  inability, making 36
it more difficult to tell who is exempted.
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interest in doing wrong, or in choosing wrongly, is an interest in treating someone else’s interests 
asymmetrically or inadequately well,  and an interest in that, like an interest in being treated 37
asymmetrically well or an interest in belittling others, is incompatible with the aims of  fairness.  It 
cannot be coherently taken into account—it cannot coherently be added to those that must be 
treated symmetrically and adequately well.  And so it must be silenced.  38
Objections will be raised to this line of  reasoning; I will consider some below.  But notice, first, 
how it answers the remaining questions:  According to the above, by freely choosing wrongly, one 
therein silences one’s own interests—one therein forfeits any claim of  fairness that might be raised by 
appeal to them.   Thus, by freely choosing wrongly, one therein, immediately, incurs a kind of  39
status, a kind of  defenselessness or moral vulnerability to sanction.  This silencing of  one’s interests, 
this moral vulnerability or defenselessness, might be the special significance of  specifically moral 
sanction.  I will hereafter call it “condemnation” (the label seems appropriate, if  we hear, in it, 
“condemning to” death, prison, hell, or to some other kind of  exile, banishment, or separateness 
from those of  us who are not condemned). 
Notice, too, that if  the above line of  reasoning is correct—or, rather, if  it is even available—we 
not only have a way to understand the special force or significance of  moral sanction, but we also 
have an explanation of  why such significance is “deserved,” in a “basic” way—without further story
—when one freely choses to do wrong:  A freely made immoral choice silences one’s interests, in 
determinations of  fairness.  Thus, if  the above line of  reasoning is available, we have a way of  
 Or, it is typically so.  Arguments of  this section may need to be restricted to what Scanlon calls the morality of  right 37
and wrong in (1998).
 Again, it is not clear what would count as treating an interest in disrespecting others symmetrically and adequately well.  38
One might say that the interest is not in disrespect, per se, but in, say, gaining the goods to be gained by the immoral 
choice (the money, e.g.).  But, that interest (in the money) has already been taken into account, in determining that the 
choice was wrong—it cannot be double-counted.
 The above line of  reasoning derives what Scanlon calls the “Forfeiture View” from contractualist reasoning, given the 39
presumption of  moral freedom.  My appeal to “forfeit,” here, is meant to echo Scanlon’s—given moral freedom, choice, 
itself, seems to carry a certain basic or fundamental moral power.  I do not mean “forfeit” to suggest a privilege that one 
might loose.  Thanks to Tommie Shelby for helpful conversation.
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understanding why someone might think that a freely made immoral choice will, itself, have an 
extraordinarily strong, immediate effect on the way in which the interests or well-being of  the 
wrongdoer should matter to the rest of  us.    40
OBJECTIONS 
Turning, now, to objections.  The lynchpin of  the above argument is the claim that, given moral 
freedom, an interest in avoiding sanction for a wrong done is tantamount to an interest in doing 
wrong.  One might object.  In particular, one might point out that, even given moral freedom, we 
should still expect ourselves sometimes to do wrong.  Humans are subject to temptation—and will 
remain so even if  graced with moral freedom.  Thus, even though, given moral freedom, everyone 
both could and should choose rightly, we must acknowledge that choosing against wrongdoing is often 
extremely difficult.  And so we should expect ourselves to sometimes do wrong, even though we 
always have the ability to avoid it.  But, if  we can expect ourselves sometimes to do wrong, then, one 
might argue, an interest in avoiding sanction for a wrong done is not tantamount to an interest in 
doing wrong—it is, rather, an interest in fair treatment after the (predictable and regrettable) fact of  
wrongdoing.  
Importantly, we can indeed, consistent with moral freedom, predict that we will sometimes freely 
do wrong.  (Kant imagined this, at the gallows.)  Nonetheless, under the presumption of  moral 
freedom, we cannot, consistently with the aims of  fairness and in good faith, plan to do wrong.  That 
is, moral freedom rules out the possibility that one might find oneself  in the position of  
Procrastinate (or Ulysses approaching the Sirenum scopuli), needing to anticipate and then plan around 
one’s own constitutional weakness—because, under the presumption of  moral freedom, one has no 
 We have seen how a freely made immoral choice entails condemnation.  We have not shown it is required for 40
condemnation.  But, it seems plausible that condemnation should be avoided unless required.  
I have, in effect, derived what Scanlon calls “the Forfeiture View” using contractualist reasoning under the assumption 
of  moral freedom.  See (Scanlon 1988, 1998). 
I have said nothing to explain why some should think it a positive good that wrongdoers suffer.  That further stretch of  
retributivist thinking needs another story.  Thanks to T. M. Scanlon for pointing this out. 
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such weakness.  If  one were to plan around one’s own predicted wrongdoing, one would 
immediately, to so speak, confront one’s victim.  To plan to do wrong is to plan to treat someone 
else’s interests asymmetrically or inadequately well.  Thus, if  one were to plan around one’s own 
predicted wrongdoing, one’s predicted victim could rightly protest: a better plan is simply to avoid 
the wrongdoing.  In fact, fairness requires it.  To plan “around” the wrong action is to plan to do it, 
which is to plan to treat them unfairly.  Given moral freedom, one cannot, consistently with the aims 
of  fairness and in good faith, make such plans.    
In fact, a prediction of  wrongdoing, together with the interests of  potential victims, is what 
provided the justification for instituting sanctions understood as incentives.  Although we cannot, in 
good faith, plan around unavoidable wrongdoing (because wrongdoing is not unavoidable), we can, 
in good faith, make plans to reduce temptation—to make choosing well less difficult.   We thereby 41
provide ourselves with a way to strengthen our resolve and protect the interests of  potential victims.   
Thus, if  a potential wrongdoer predicts wrongdoing, then, once we remember the victim, it may 
seem the right response is not to curtail the sanction but rather to strengthen it—to make it more 
daunting, and thereby more effective.  The stronger the sanction, the more we have reinforced the 
wrongdoer’s native ability to choose well.  42
If  a potential wrongdoer objects, suggesting the sanction instead be curtailed, the potential 
victim could make the following argument:  The victim is unable to protect themselves against the 
burdens imposed upon them by the wrong—they are, so to speak, at the mercy of  the wrongdoer.  
But, given moral freedom, the wrongdoer can avoid both the burdens they impose on the victim and 
the burdens that will be imposed on them, in the sanction, simply by choosing well—which is, by 
stipulation, what fairness requires.  For the wrongdoer to claim the sanction is unfair is to suggest 
 My thinking, here, is indebted to Berislav Marusic’s [FIX] careful treatment of  “difficult action” in his (2015).41
 Could we make a sanction severe enough to always prevent wrongdoing?  Probably not.  But, if  we enjoy moral 42
freedom, then to choose to incur a maximal sanction (to incur the wrath of  hell, say) would be to prefer self-destruction 
and the wronging of  another over self-preservation without that wrong.  Given moral freedom, it is unclear why fairness 
requires that we prevent someone from implementing that preference.  (See all the caveats below.)
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that the victim accept a risk that the wrongdoer both could and should neutralize by incurring only 
those costs that have already been outweighed in determining that the action is wrong.  To suggest 
that the victim should accept a risk that the wrongdoer should and could costlessly (so to speak) 
neutralize is to claim that the interests of  the victim should be treated asymmetrically poorly.  Such a 
claim is incompatible with deliberations of  fairness, and will be silenced.  43
This silencing response is hard.   Can it be softened?  Could we find some other way to respond to 44
the prediction of  wrongdoing by making it less difficult to avoid, without silencing the interests of  
the wrongdoer?    45
Let me note, again, it is sufficient for my diagnostic goal if  the silencing response is available as 
way to understand the condemnatory significance of  moral sanction and its connection to a strong 
sort of  freedom.  Even if  silencing is not required by moral freedom, it may yet provide a way of  
understanding certain strongly held but rarely explained intuitions about desert and condemnation.  
Nonetheless, I am (at the moment) convinced that silencing follows from moral freedom.  But I 
will postpone consideration of  softer responses until after clarifying the implications of  silencing—
because, although hard, they not as hard as might at first seem.  
The silencing response claims that, under the presumption of  moral freedom, a wrongdoer has 
forfeited any complaint of  fairness they might have raised, on their own behalf, about burdens they suffer 
as a sanction for wrong choice.  It claims that when one freely chooses wrong, one thereby silences 
one’s own interest and so incurs a particular kind of  status that might well be labeled 
“condemnation.” 
 I thank T. M. Scanlon for “costlessly.”    43
Note, too, the reemergence of  the fantasy: Were we morally free, we could, collectively, control all non-natural evil, 
simply by choosing well.  Fairness would require it.
 The spirit of  the silencing response might be seen in an old sketch by Bob Newhart: https://www.youtube.com/44
watch?v=Ow0lr63y4Mw 
 Thanks to Stephen White and Elizabeth Fricker for pressing for other options.45
27
—draft—
The silencing response does not claim that, under moral freedom, there are no limitations or 
restrictions on morally appropriate sanctions.  There are.  Because of  the real-world possibility of  
false accusation, sanctions must be minimal, and, to be fair, they must be enforced uniformly.  Thus, 
the minimally effective sanction must be the one even the genuine wrongdoer faces, in the real 
world.  Thus, the silencing of  the wrongdoer’s interests will not have any effect on, so to speak, the 
material sanctions it is fair to institute.  It will only have an effect on what we earlier called the 
significance of  those sanctions: Those who are confident in the accusation and convinced of  moral 
freedom will likewise be confident that the wrongdoer stands morally vulnerable, “condemned.” 
They will see those same material burdens as now carrying that condemnatory force.  46
Importantly, the silencing response also does not claim that, in doing wrong, the wrongdoer is 
silenced.  Rather, in doing wrong, the wrongdoer has silenced their own interests for the purpose of  
determining the fairness of  a sanction.  But the wrongdoer is not, themselves, silenced: they may make 
other important complaints.  Here are some: 
Most broadly, simple human decency requires us to consider the interests of  all creatures, even 
wrongdoers.  Certain sanctions are cruel or inhumane, and those should be avoided, independently 
of  their fairness.  The wrongdoer can appeal to their own interests and ask for mercy or complain 
of  indecency or a lack of  generosity.   This possibility remains, even given moral freedom.  47
More narrowly, a genuine wrongdoer may even complain of  the unfairness of  the sanction, so 
long as they do so without reference to their own interests.  If  subjected to a more-than-minimal 
material sanction (one that is “disproportionate”), the wrongdoer could correctly complain that it is 
unfair.  But, importantly, a genuine wrongdoer could do so only by invoking the interests of  others—
 The proponent of  moral freedom may advise doubting any such confidence: Condemnation may be reserved for the 46
omniscient.  As I understand it, Kant’s position is somewhere in this neighborhood.
 Thanks to Julie Tannenbaum for emphasizing generosity.47
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viz., the potentially falsely accused.   Similarly, the wrongdoer might point out that certain kinds of  48
sanctions, or certain severity of  sanction, are likely to lead to social strife, and therefore put the 
interests of  the innocent unfairly at risk.  The wrongdoer could, again, thereby complain about the 
fairness of  the sanction, without appeal to their own interests.   
The only thing ruled out by moral freedom is a complaint of  unfairness by appeal to their own 
interests.   Still, this is a significant limitation.  Qua wrongdoer, you stand, in one important way, 49
defenseless—your interests do not constrain the burdens that may be fairly imposed upon you.  
Even though we can, and doubtless should, take them into account as a matter of  decency or 
humanity or proportionality or good (fair) policy, you cannot insist on it as a matter of  fairness to you.  
If  you ask others to do unto you, they can fairly reply that you made your bed.  For yourself, you 
cannot ask for justice, but only mercy. 
Now, can we find a softer response?  We have seen that, given moral freedom, we cannot take 
wrongdoing as unavoidable and plan around it.  We must, instead, plan to make avoiding the 
avoidable less difficult.  Instituting sanctions is one way.  Could we find another?  Could we, e.g., 
arrange society so there are fewer opportunities to choose wrongly?   
We certainly could and should—but, to be fair, we cannot ask potential victims to accept risks or 
costs that could instead be neutralized by freely avoiding immoral choice.  This will be a significant 
limitation.  
 Or, perhaps to themselves qua potentially falsely accused, but not to themselves qua wrongdoer.  48
I have identified concerns about proportionality as concerns about the minimally effective sanction, given the possibility 
of  false accusation.  One might, instead, think there is some bedrock principle of  proportionality.  If  so, the principle of  
proportionality is playing the same kind of  independent role as decency or generosity—it is something that we ought to 
attend to.  It does not allow the wrongdoer to stand on their own interests and complain that they have not been treated 
symmetrically and adequately well, relative to those of  others.  Thanks to Marshall Thompson for pressing this point.
 One might note that the unlucky also cannot complain of  unfairness by appeal to their own interests—the sanction is 49
also fair, in their case, despite the burden on their interests.  However, the interests of  the unlucky are not silenced—
their interests ensure the sanction is minimal.  The silencing generates the “condemnatory force” of  the sanction.  
Thanks to Rachel Achs. 
29
—draft—
One might think we have not yet made full use of  the fact that we can predict our own 
wrongdoing—that occasional wrongdoing is our common fate common among us.  One might 
point out that we may all sometimes find ourselves too weak of  will to avoid wrongdoing, here-and-
now correctly predict that we will freely choose wrongly, in the future.  Given this recognition of  our 
common weakness moral failing, can we find a way to take the interests of  the wrongdoer into 
account, as a matter of  fairness? 
I do not yet see how, given moral freedom.  Acknowledging that we each have packaged 
together, in one skin, across time, both victim and free wrongdoer, does not provide us an answer to 
a victim’s complaint.  Each victim can still rightly insist that a better plan is to avoid the wrong.  50
Suppose we deny moral freedom and allow, instead, not just moral failing, but true moral weakness
—suppose we deny Kant, at the gallows.  We thereby allow it possible to find oneself  in the position 
of  either the hardbitten or the reasonably sensitive man: seeing two options, but finding one 
impossible to take, not a genuine option, even though the alternative is wrong.  Our wills are then 
weak in something like the straightforward sense in which our muscles are sometimes weak.  If  we 
anticipate such weakness, we then find ourselves in the position of  Procrastinate (or Ulysses), 
needing to plan around predicted wrongdoing.  But now, the victim cannot protest that a better plan 
is simply to avoid the wrongdoing—though avoiding wrong is, certainly, a better plan, it may not be 
available.  Thus, once we acknowledge the possibility of  moral weakness, we loose the lynchpin of  
the original argument:  It is no longer the case that seeking to protect the interests burdened by a 
sanction against wrongdoing is tantamount to seeking to protect an interest in doing wrong.  It may, 
instead, be to protect one’s interests given the predictable, inexcusable, but nonetheless unavoidable 
 One might conclude no one is to be spared, and so we need to adjust.  But that would be, it seems, to adjust what 50
counts as wrong.  ADD.
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fact of  wrongdoing.   Given moral weakness, we may plan around our own wrongdoing in as much 51
good faith as we are capable of  mustering. 
Of  course, to plan around wrongdoing is still to plan to do it, and so it is still to plan to treat 
potential victims unfairly—such plans are inconsistent with the aims of  fairness.  But the 
inconsistency is now in us, so to speak.  It is no longer in the reasoning about the fairness of  a 
sanction.  When reasoning about the fairness of  the sanction, we can take into account the interests 
burdened by unavoidable wrongdoing, just as we can take into account the interests of  the unlucky.  
It can be sanctioned, but it will not be condemned.   
One might wonder: Though we could take into account the interests of  morally weak, why would 
we?  Why would we allow the morally weak—those who treat us badly—to be counted among those 
who interests should be treated symmetrically and adequately well?  Why not reserve fairness for the 
fair?   
We might now appeal to our common humanity, to our original sin: none of  us are morally free.  
Our ability to avoid wrong must be developed, and its development is fraught with contingency and 
luck.  In that development, each of  us has encountered our own weakness—or, if  not, that would 
be, itself, a matter of  tremendously good luck.  And so, were we to exclude the weak, few if  any 
would be left.  More, those excluded could say, “Here but for the grace of  God go you.”  
Interestingly, they would then not be seeking mercy, but appealing to fairness.  
But: What about cases in which our wills are not weak?  Even allowing for original sin, most of  us, 
most of  the time, are able to avoid this or that immoral choice.  Wrongdoing is not always—or, 
 How can something unavoidable be inexcusable?  In denying moral freedom, we deny that ought implies can.  We can 51
then acknowledge weakness without denying responsibility.  The full argument will be presented in Minds that Matter.
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even, very often—unavoidable.   Yet, often enough, we choose wrongly.  It seems, then, that most 52
of  us, most of  the time, stand condemned when we make an immoral choice.    53
This conclusion is sometimes sought: by distinguishing the able from the weak, we could rule 
out condemnation in certain cases (perhaps, cases such as Robert Alton Harris or Jo Jo), while 
preserving it for ordinary, garden-variety wrongdoings.    54
This seems to me the wrong conclusion to draw from the fact of  original sin—though I am, at 
the moment, unable to clearly state why.   One quick problem is that the odd exercise in which we 55
have been engaged (in our attempt to understand why unlucky sanction should be less than “truly” 
unfair) is misguided: moral choices cannot be incentivized, and so are not legitimate objects of  
sanction.   Thus, “moral sanction” is, itself, misconceived.  More, it seems to me we have no 56
business sanctioning one another for choices, rather than for outcomes—fraught, though they are, 
with luck.  
Many will disagree.  Some will feel that, if  we give up moral sanctions and use only pricing 
systems, we are giving up all that is distinctive about responses to moral failure—that we are moving 
to a mere “utilitarian” system of  social control.  I strongly disagree.  Rather than avoid the ugliness 
of  social control by appeal to the distinctive significance of  moral sanction (which seems, to me, 
trading one attempt at control for another), we should instead consider the distinctive significance 
of  moral failure—which is not, I would argue, that of  being liable to a sanction.  It is, instead, the 
significance or importance of  standing in certain sorts of  relationships with other people, 
 In fact, I suspect that it must typically be avoidable.  See (Hieronymi 2020).52
 Though, perhaps, actual condemning requires omniscience, for its implementation.53
 Those who seek to distinguish the able from the weak use “blame” or “opprobrium” where I use “condemnation.”  54
They also have in mind what they characterize as the special significance of  moral sanction, but they would deny that it 
entails the silencing of  interests.  See (Wolf  1990, Wallace 1996, 2011).  See, too Strawson’s though on the “withdrawal 
of  good will” in (1962).  Elsewhere I provide an alternative account of  the significance of  moral failure, one that is not a 
sanction.  My alternative does not mark this difference between the able and the weak.  
 Thanks to Richard Moran for extremely helpful conversation.55
 A moral choice is a choice for certain reasons and not others.   56
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relationships of  regard or respect.   Mattering to others, not meriting negative consequences, is 57
what morality, and moral responsibility, is about.  
CONCLUSION 
To summarize:  Sanctions raise concerns of  fairness because they involve voluntary actions that 
burden others; any such action raises such concerns.  The fairness of  a sanction typically requires an 
opportunity to avoid it, because otherwise it burdens interests for no purpose.  However, sometimes 
making an exception is, itself, burdensome, and so it is sometimes possible to fairly incur a sanction 
through bad luck.    
So understood, sanctions do not carry moral significance; they are pricing systems.  It is 
tempting to think, if  we instead consider moral sanctions, which carry a distinctive significance, then 
sanctioning the unlucky is always unfair.   
What is this distinctive significance?  And why does it rule out luck? 
I offered a hypothesis: If  we first presume moral freedom and then consider sanctions for 
immoral choices, we not only rule out bad luck, but we also find that the fairness of  such sanctions 
is unlimited by the interests of  the wrongdoer.  To have one’s interests thus silenced by one’s freely 
made immoral choice is a kind of  condemnation.  This condemnation might be the special significance 
of  moral sanction—it follows, immediately, from a freely made immoral choice.  We would then 
have a way to understand why “basic desert” or “true moral responsibility” might require an 
especially strong form of  freedom.    58
For my own part, I do not think we enjoy moral freedom, nor do I think we should be in the 
business of  instituting sanctions for choices.  So I think we should give up on condemnation.  
 It will be crucial that interpersonal responses to moral failure are not voluntary—and so not attempts at control.  In 57
Strawson’s words, they “do not merely exploit our nature, but express it.”  Thanks to Christine Korsgaard and Tamar 
Shapiro for pressing for clarification.  For further elaboration, see (Hieronymi 2019, 2020, in progress).
 See note XX (follow from vs. required by)58
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Some will worry that we would then give up what is distinctive about moral responsibility—we 
would move to mere social control.  To the contrary, I believe we can give up condemnation without 
giving up what is distinctive of  moral responsibility—but that is a topic for another day.  59
 This paper has benefitted tremendously from the input of  many.  Thanks are due, of  course, to the audience at 59
NOWAR, as well as to audiences at UCSD, Harvard, Notre Dame, Yale, the Oxford/Toronto/UCLA Workshop, Varieties of  
Agency at Stanford, University of  Miami, FSU, and Taking Responsibility and Holding Responsible at the Center for the Study 
of  Mind and Nature, Oslo.  In addition, I would like to thank Brendon de Kenessey, Berislav Marusic, Michael 
McKenna, T. M. Scanlon, and Angela M. Smith for written comments, and David Brink, Andreas Brekke Carlsson, 
Randall Clarke, Jorah Dannenberg, Stephen Darwall, Elizabeth Fricker, Mark C. Johnson, Shelly Kagan, Martin Kavka, 
Sean Kelsey, Christine Korsgaard, Gavin Lawrence, Richard Moran, Dana Nelkin, Calvin Normore, Jonathan 
Schwenkler, Tamar Shapiro, Tommie Shelby, David Shoemaker, Sarah Stroud, Julie Tannenbaum, Marshall Thompson, 
Patrick Todd, Manuel Vargas, Stephen J. White, and Yuan Yuan for helpful questions or conversation.
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